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<title>Colin J. Zick - Security, Privacy and The Law</title>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/colin-zick.html</link>
<description><![CDATA[Colin Zick’s  practice is focused on health care and compliance issues, and often involves  the intersection of those two subjects in administrative proceedings or  litigation.  He frequently counsels  clients on issues involving health and business information privacy and  security (including HIPAA).   His work  has had a particular emphasis on compliance issues related to pharmaceutical  and medical device companies, hospitals, practitioners (including physicians,  dentists, optometrists, psychologists, veterinarians), and provider  organizations. This compliance work includes helping clients establish and  maintain effective compliance programs. Colin defends clients in disputes  alleging kickbacks, overpayments, and billing and coding problems, and  represents before various state health care licensing and regulatory entities. 
Colin’s practice  also includes work on health care transactional matters. These projects include  the establishment of joint ventures, the establishment of new entities,  drafting and negotiation of employment contracts, and negotiating clinical  trial agreements. 
Colin’s  practice also includes clients in industries beyond health care, ranging from  the music industry to Internet start-ups. He has been involved in litigation  relating to antitrust and unfair competition claims, and copyright  infringement.

Practice Areas

    Security and Privacy
    Healthcare
    Life Sciences
      Additional Practice Areas: Litigation, Business  Crimes &amp; Government Investigations, Product Liability &amp; Complex Tort,  Medicare Coverage &amp; Reimbursement 
    

Professional Associations

  New England Council       -- Health Care and Technology Committees 
  American Health       Lawyers Association, Member (Participant, Fraud and Abuse Enforcement       Panel) 
  Health Care Compliance       Association, Member 
  American Bar       Association, Member
    
       Litigation Section 
    
  
  
  Health Law       Section
  Massachusetts Bar       Association, Member 
  Boston Bar Association, Member 

Education

  University of Michigan, B.A., Political       Science, with highest distinction, Phi Beta Kappa
  University of Michigan Law School, J.D., cum       laude
  
Bar Admissions

  Massachusetts
     New Hampshire
     U.S. District Court for the District of New       Hampshire
     U.S. District Court for the District of       Massachusetts
     U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
     U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
  
For a comprehensive account of Colin's professional experience visit the Foley Hoag Web site.]]></description>
<language>en-us</language>
<copyright>Copyright 2012</copyright>
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<pubDate>Sat, 04 Feb 2012 09:14:44 -0500</pubDate>
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<item>
<title>What Facebook&apos;s IPO Means for Users</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>I&nbsp;was interviewed for this <a href="http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/249163/what_facebooks_ipo_means_for_users.html">PC World piece </a>on the potential impact of <a href="http://www.facebook.com">Facebook's </a>recently announced <a href="http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9223897/Update_Facebook_files_for_5B_IPO">IPO </a>on data privacy.&nbsp; My take:&nbsp; being a public company brings with it more transparency and more regulation, which will force Facebook to be more cautious and ultimately more open about its privacy policies.&nbsp; This seems obvious to me, but there are those who suggest that being public will add a profit motive that will push Facebook in the other direction.&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/02/articles/financial-information/what-facebooks-ipo-means-for-users/</link>
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<category>Facebook</category><category>Financial Industry Spotlight</category><category>IPO</category><category>Retail Industry &amp; Customer Information Spotlight</category><category>data</category><category>privacy</category>
<pubDate>Sat, 04 Feb 2012 09:04:05 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>Massachusetts Data Security Law - Contract Grandfather Provision Expires March 1, 2012</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Our colleagues have <a href="http://www.foleyhoag.com/NewsCenter/Publications/Alerts/Investment-Adviser/Foley-Adviser-013112b.aspx">reminded us </a>that on&nbsp;March 1, 2012, the contract grandfathering provisions of the Massachusetts Data Security Law and Regulations will expire:</p>
<div id="content_0_pnlAuthors">
<p>by <a href="http://www.foleyhoag.com/People/Attorneys/Anderson-Catherine.aspx">Catherine M. Anderson</a>, <a href="http://www.foleyhoag.com/People/Attorneys/Collins-Jeffrey.aspx">Jeffrey D. Collins</a>&nbsp;</p>
<p>As we previously noted in our <a href="http://www.foleyhoag.com/NewsCenter/Publications/Alerts/Investment-Adviser/Foley-Adviser-020310b.aspx">Foley Adviser dated February 3, 2010</a>, &ldquo;New <a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2009/11/articles/security-privacy-alerts/massachusetts-regulators-finalizing-information-security-regulations-keep-march-1-2010-deadline/">Massachusetts Data Security Law and Regulations</a>-Comprehensive Information Security Plan required before March 1, 2010&rdquo;, under the regulations, an investment adviser must require third-party service providers by contract to implement and maintain appropriate security measures for personal information. There currently is a grandfather provision that deems any contract with a service provider entered into before March 1, 2010 to be in compliance even if it makes no reference to data protection.</p>
<p>The grandfather provision expires on March 1, 2012, so any contract regardless of when signed must be brought into compliance by March 1, 2012. You should take steps to ensure that your third party service provider contracts are now in compliance.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/recent-legislation-1/massachusetts-data-security-law-contract-grandfather-provision-expires-march-1-2012/</link>
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<category>Financial Industry Spotlight</category><category>Government Enforcement</category><category>Legislation &amp; Regulation</category><category>March 1, 2012</category><category>Massachusetts Data Security Law</category><category>contract</category><category>grandfather</category>
<pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 14:19:32 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>Retailer&apos;s Request for Zip Code Violated Law, But Generated No Harm</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>A <a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/tyler v michaels.pdf">decision</a> in <u>Tyler v. Michaels Stores </u>earlier this month from the <a href="http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/">United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts</a>, the use of a consumer's <a href="http://zip4.usps.com/zip4/">Zip Code </a>to find her address and send her mailings was held to be a statutory violation, but did not give rise to a claim for damages.</p>
<p>Melissa Tyler&nbsp;brought suit against <a href="http://www.michaels.com/">Michaels Stores </a>for violation of Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 93, section 105(a) on behalf of herself and a putative class, claiming that Michaels illegally requested customers&rsquo; ZIP codes when processing their credit card transactions in violation<br />
of the section 105(a).&nbsp; She&nbsp;alleged that the violation of section 105(a) amounted to a per se violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection law,&nbsp;chapter 93A, section 9, caused unjust enrichment, and entitled Tyler to declaratory relief pursuant.</p>
<p>Judge Young found that&nbsp;&quot;a ZIP code can indeed be personal identification information under<br />
Section 105(a)&quot; but that no harm resulted (that Ms. Tyler's receipt of advertisements for the store was not sufficient to constitute harm):</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">In the area of identity fraud, a judge in this district has similarly held that where there were no instances of actual data loss or misappropriation, the failure to comply with minimum<br />
statutory security standards did not cause cognizable injury because the added risk of identity fraud did not actually cause harm to the plaintiff. <u>Katz v. Pershing</u>, LLC, Civil Action No.<br />
10&ndash;12227-RGS, 2011 WL 3678720, at *4 (D. Mass. Aug. 23, 2011) (Stearns, J)....[R]eceiving unwanted commercial advertising through the mail is simply not an injury cognizable under chapter 93A, since Section 105(a) was enacted to prevent fraud.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>Section 105(a) provides in relevant part:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity that accepts a credit card for a business transaction shall write, cause to be written or require that a credit card holder write personal identification information, not required by the credit card issuer, on the credit card transaction form. Personal identification information shall include, but shall not be limited to, <br />
a credit card holder&rsquo;s address or telephone number. The provisions of this section shall apply to all credit card transactions; provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not be construed to prevent a person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity<br />
from requesting information that is necessary for shipping, delivery or installation of purchased<br />
merchandise or services or for a warranty when such information is provided voluntarily by a credit card holder.</p>
<p>Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, &sect; 105(a).</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/financial-information/retailers-request-for-zip-code-violated-law-but-generated-no-harm/</link>
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<category>93A</category><category>Financial Industry Spotlight</category><category>Katz v. Pershing</category><category>Legislation &amp; Regulation</category><category>Michaels Stores</category><category>Retail Industry &amp; Customer Information Spotlight</category><category>Tyler</category><category>Zip Code</category><category>consumer</category><category>personal information</category><category>section 105</category>
<pubDate>Sat, 28 Jan 2012 11:08:51 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>More on Google&apos;s Privacy Policy</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Here is an excerpt from my interview yesterday with <a href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/author/jon-mitchell.php">Jon Mitchell </a>of <a href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/">ReadWriteWeb</a>:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">&quot;From a legal perspective, I'm not seeing anything that's much different in what's being proposed to take effect on March 1 and what's in place right now,&quot; Zick says. &quot;In particular, the language about sharing across services has been in [Google's policies] for a long time.&quot;</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">Zick points out that all the past versions of Google's privacy policies are <a href="http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/archive/">on the website</a>, and the last two versions offer line-by-line comparisons to the previous version. Zick expects that Google will do the same with the new policy once it's officially issued.</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">&quot;What we have is not a reaction to a change in legal language,&quot; Zick says, &quot;but it's a change in perception. ... People are just reflexively reacting to the idea that <a href="http://www.google.com">Google </a>is big.&quot;</p>
<p>The entire article can be viewed <a href="http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/tech_world_overreacts_to_googles_new_privacy_polic.php">here</a>, and our earlier post <a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/retail-customer-information-sp/google-changes-its-privacy-policies/">here</a>.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/government-enforcement/more-on-googles-privacy-policy/</link>
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<category>Google</category><category>Government Enforcement</category><category>Jon Mitchell</category><category>Legal</category><category>ReadWriteWeb</category><category>Retail Industry &amp; Customer Information Spotlight</category><category>change</category><category>policy</category><category>privacy</category>
<pubDate>Fri, 27 Jan 2012 12:30:21 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>Google Changes Its Privacy Policies</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>As many of you have probably seen already, Google is <a href="https://www.google.com/policies/#utm_source=googlehp&amp;utm_medium=hpp&amp;utm_campaign=en-us-hpp_pp">changing its privacy policies</a>, effective March 1, 2012.&nbsp; These changes will be effective across all of Google's platforms, and users will not be able to opt out.&nbsp; A user's only choice to avoid these changes will be to leave Google's search engine, Gmail, Calendar, Search, and YouTube; there is no &quot;opt out&quot; or selective acceptance/rejection of these new policies.&nbsp; In this regard, Google noted that it remains committed to <a href="http://www.dataliberation.org/">data liberation</a>, &quot;<a href="https://www.google.com/policies/faq/">so if you want to take your information elsewhere you can</a>.&quot;</p>
<p>These changes&nbsp;are likely to draw FTC scrutiny, especially in light of the recent decision by Google to incorporate data from its social network, Google+, into search results, which&nbsp;has already resulted&nbsp;in a <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-facing-expanded-antitrust-probe-over-social-search-service/2012/01/13/gIQAL0dFxP_story.html">FTC&nbsp;antitrust investigation</a>.&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/retail-customer-information-sp/google-changes-its-privacy-policies/</link>
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<category>FTC</category><category>Google</category><category>Retail Industry &amp; Customer Information Spotlight</category><category>data liberation</category><category>policy</category><category>privacy</category>
<pubDate>Tue, 24 Jan 2012 20:55:04 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>Jail Time for Man Who Accessed Computer of a Competing Medical Practice</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>An Atlanta, Georgia man was <a href="http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/press/2012/01-10-12.html">sentenced earlier this month&nbsp;</a>to one year and one month in prison for intentionally accessing a computer of a competing medical practice, and taking personal information of the patients.&nbsp; The individual made this&nbsp;improper access&nbsp;in order to send marketing materials to patients at the other practice.</p>
<p>The individual&nbsp;worked as an information technology specialist for&nbsp;a perinatal medical practice in Atlanta.&nbsp; He separated from employment from the first practice&nbsp;and joined a competing perinatal medical practice,&nbsp;located in the same building.&nbsp;&nbsp;He then&nbsp;used his home computer to hack into his former employer's&nbsp;patient database.&nbsp; He downloaded the names, telephone numbers, and addresses of&nbsp;his former employer's&nbsp;patients and then&nbsp;deleted all the patient information from&nbsp;their system. He&nbsp;subsequently used the patient names and contact information to launch a direct-mail marketing campaign for the benefit of his new employer.&nbsp; Even so, there was no evidence that&nbsp;patient medical information was accessed or misused.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>United States Attorney Sally Quillian Yates said, &ldquo;Anyone who gives their personal information to a doctor or medical facility does not expect that their information will be hacked and used to make money. The cost of medical care is already high enough without patients having to pay a heavier cost with the loss of their privacy. This is cybercrime. Electronic information is bought, sold and stolen, often by someone who knows a system and, with a few keystrokes, makes our community vulnerable.&rdquo;</p>
<p>McNEAL was sentenced to 1 year, 1 month in prison to be followed by 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to perform 120 hours of community service. McNEAL pleaded guilty to the charge on September 28, 2011.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/medical-information/jail-time-for-man-who-accessed-computer-of-a-competing-medical-practice/</link>
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<category>Cybersecurity &amp; Cybercrime</category><category>Data Breach</category><category>Government Enforcement</category><category>HIPAA</category><category>Healthcare Industry Spotlight</category><category>computer</category><category>download</category><category>medical practice</category>
<pubDate>Tue, 24 Jan 2012 08:04:10 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>Supreme Court Holds Warrant Required for GPS Tracking</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The Supreme Court today issued <a href="http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1259.pdf">an opinion </a>holding that police cannot track a suspect using GPS&nbsp;without first getting a warrant.</p>
<p>Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, for a unanimous court, and concluded:&nbsp; &quot;We hold that the Government&rsquo;s installation of a GPS device on a target&rsquo;s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle&rsquo;s movements, constitutes a 'search.'&nbsp; It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.&quot;</p>
<p>This statement about the government occupying private property is going to be used in many future arguments.&nbsp; Justice Sotomayor's concurrence foresees this future:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F. 3d 1120, 1125 (CA9 2010) (Kozinski, C. J., dissenting from denial of rehearing enbanc). In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion&rsquo;s trespassory test may provide little guidance.&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/government-enforcement/supreme-court-holds-warrant-required-for-gps-tracking/</link>
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<category>GPS</category><category>Government Enforcement</category><category>Supreme Court</category><category>search</category><category>trespass</category><category>warrant</category>
<pubDate>Mon, 23 Jan 2012 11:33:40 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>HHS Reports on Breaches of Unsecured Protected Health Information</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In its recent <a href="http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachrept.pdf">Annual Report to Congress on Breaches of Unsecured Protected Health Information</a>, the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human Services, we see confirmation of certain trends-- bigger breaches and breaches involving theft of electronic media:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">Between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2010, breaches involving 500 or more individuals also made up less than one percent of reports, yet accounted for more than 99 percent of the more than 5.4 million individuals who were affected by a breach of their protected health information. The largest breaches in 2010, like 2009, occurred as a result of theft. However, in comparison to 2009, in 2010, the number of individuals affected by the loss of electronic media or paper records containing protected health information was greater than the number of individuals affected by unauthorized access or human error.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/cybersecurity-cybercrime/hhs-reports-on-breaches-of-unsecured-protected-health-information/</link>
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<category>Annual Report</category><category>Congress</category><category>Cybersecurity &amp; Cybercrime</category><category>Department of Health and Human Services</category><category>HHS</category><category>Healthcare Industry Spotlight</category><category>OCR</category><category>Office of Civil Rights</category><category>Unsecured Protected Health Information</category><category>breach</category>
<pubDate>Sun, 22 Jan 2012 20:53:33 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>Medicare Contractors Lag on Information Security</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This <a href="http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region1/181030300.asp">report </a>from the Office of the <a href="http://oig.hhs.gov/">Inspector General </a>for the Department of Health and Human Services reveals significant holes in Medicare contractor security.&nbsp; Here's a notable excerpt:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px"><strong><u>Security Awareness Training<br />
</u></strong>The Computer Security Act of 1987 (P.L. No. 100-235) requires periodic training in computer security awareness and accepted computer practices for all employees who manage, use, or operate Federal computer systems. Additionally, Federal regulations (5 C.F.R. &sect; 930.301(a)) require that role-specific training be provided based on each user&rsquo;s security responsibilities and require agencies to provide training for employees with significant information security responsibilities. The CMS Business Partners Systems Security Manual requires Medicare contractors to document and monitor information security training activities.<br />
<br />
Sixteen of the twenty-one Medicare contractors had no identified gaps in security awareness training, while the remaining 5 had 3 to 4 gaps each. In total, 16 gaps were identified in this area, with no gaps assigned to a high-impact subcategory. Following are examples of gaps in security awareness training:<br />
<br />
&bull; The contractor did not formally track and monitor job-specific security training to ensure that employees received the minimal requirements stated in the policy.<br />
&bull; Employees did not complete security awareness refresher training.<br />
<br />
Employees who are unaware of their security responsibilities or have not received adequate training may be at increased risk of causing or exacerbating a computer security incident. If security personnel are not provided specific job-related training, management has no assurance that these employees can effectively perform their job responsibilities. Inadequately trained employees could cause the loss, destruction, or misuse of sensitive information and information technology (IT) assets.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/medical-information/medicare-contractors-lag-on-information-security/</link>
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<category>Government Enforcement</category><category>Healthcare Industry Spotlight</category><category>Medicare</category><category>OIG</category><category>contractor</category><category>security</category>
<pubDate>Sun, 22 Jan 2012 20:44:07 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>Unite Against the Cyber Enemy:  Banks and Others Join Forces</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Interesting <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203436904577151230598919896.html">Wall Street Journal article </a>about rival banks joining forces to beat cyber crime.&nbsp;&nbsp; Sounds a lot like the <a href="http://www.massinsight.com/initiatives/cyber_security_center/">Advanced Cyber Security Center</a>.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/cybersecurity-cybercrime/unite-against-the-cyber-enemy-banks-and-others-join-forces/</link>
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<category>Cybersecurity &amp; Cybercrime</category><category>Financial Industry Spotlight</category>
<pubDate>Sun, 22 Jan 2012 17:15:55 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>Inside Counsel Magazine Revisits SEC&apos;s Cybersecurity Guidance</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>As <a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/10/articles/cybersecurity-cybercrime/sec-publishes-guidance-on-cyber-incidents/">we noted back in October</a>, the <a href="http://www.sec.gov/"><font color="#0073cf">SEC </font></a>issued <a href="http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm"><font color="#0073cf">CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2:&nbsp; Cybersecurity</font></a>.<br />
This guidance provides the <a href="http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin.shtml"><font color="#0073cf">Division of Corporation Finance's </font></a>views regarding disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/01/01/sec-issues-guidance-on-cybersecurity-disclosure">most recent issue of<em> <u>Inside Counsel </u></em></a>follows up on the latest views on this Guidance, including a quote from me.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/cybersecurity-cybercrime/inside-counsel-magazine-revisits-secs-cybersecurity-guidance/</link>
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<category>Corporation</category><category>Cybersecurity &amp; Cybercrime</category><category>Division</category><category>Finance</category><category>Financial</category><category>Government Enforcement</category><category>Industry</category><category>Legislation &amp; Regulation</category><category>SEC</category><category>Spotlight</category><category>cyber</category><category>cybercrime</category><category>cybersecurity</category><category>disclosure</category><category>guidance</category><category>incidents</category><category>legislation</category><category>obligations</category><category>of</category><category>regulation</category><category>risks</category>
<pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 2012 14:05:32 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>SEC Issues Guidance On Use of Social Media by Investment Advisers</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>My colleagues Jen Audeh and Jeff Collins have analyzed the SEC's&nbsp;guidance on the use of social media by investment advisors.&nbsp;&nbsp;Because of the overlap this issue has with data privacy and security, we are providing this except and a <a href="http://www.foleyhoag.com/NewsCenter/Publications/Alerts/Investment-Adviser/Foley-Adviser-011312.aspx">link to their summary</a>:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">On January 4, 2012 the SEC&rsquo;s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations issued an exam alert to registered investment advisers which included guidance on the use of social media. The <a target="_blank" href="http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/riskalert-socialmedia.pdf">alert</a> is not meant to be a comprehensive summary of all compliance matters related to the use of social media, but rather is intended to cover measures that may assist advisers in developing procedures to prevent violations of the Advisers Act and other federal securities law with respect to the use of social media such as the antifraud, compliance and record keeping provisions.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p><strong>Third-Party Content </strong></p>
<p>The alert warns that particular attention should be paid to potential federal securities law violations stemming from third-party content posted on a firm&rsquo;s social media site. Specifically, firms should be careful to prevent &ldquo;testimonials&rdquo; from being posted on a site. The staff advises that, depending on the facts and circumstances, certain functions on a social media site such as a &ldquo;like&rdquo; button could be considered a testimonial under the Advisers Act. If such function cannot be disabled, investment advisers should consider monitoring and removing third-party postings if necessary. A firm should also consider the extent to which a third-party should be allowed to post on the firm&rsquo;s social media site. For example, some firms restrict postings to authorized users, others only allow the firms&rsquo; employees to post on the site and others have no restrictions on posting. Regardless of the extent to which third-party posts are allowed, a firm should consider having policies and procedures concerning third-party posts. A firm should also consider disclaimers on their social media site stating that it does not approve or endorse any third-party communications.</p>
<p><strong>Record Keeping Responsibilities </strong></p>
<p>The record keeping obligations for communications that relate to the advisers&rsquo; recommendations or advice under the Advisers Act do not distinguish between various forms of media used by advisers. In the alert, the staff states that &ldquo;investment advisers that communicate through social media must retain records of those communications if they contain information that satisfies an investment adviser&rsquo;s recordkeeping obligations under the Advisers Act.&rdquo; A firm should review any document retention policies to ensure that communications generated by social media communications are covered by the policy and will be retained in compliance with the federal securities laws. &emsp;</p>
<p><strong>Compliance Programs </strong></p>
<p>Rather than possibly having multiple overlapping policies and procedures covering advertisements, client communications and electronic communications that may each address in part the different risks associated with the use of social media, the alert suggests developing a separate and distinct policy for the use of social media. The staff suggests considering the following factors when crafting a social media policy:</p>
<p><em>Usage Guidelines.</em> Consider creating guidelines that provide investment adviser representatives and solicitors with guidance on the appropriate and inappropriate use of social media. This might include a list of approved social media sites and permitted or restricted activities on those sites.</p>
<p><em>Content Standards</em>. Consider whether content contains investment recommendations, information on specific investment services or investment performance and whether such content implicates any fiduciary duties or other regulatory issues.</p>
<p><em>Monitoring and Frequency of Monitoring</em>. Consider procedures for monitoring the firm&rsquo;s social media sites or use of third-party sites. The alert notes that a firm should consider the volume and pace of communications posted on a social media site to determine whether periodic, daily or real-time monitoring of posts is appropriate. The alert also states that &ldquo;[t]he after-the fact review of violative content days after it was posted on a firm&rsquo;s social networking site, depending on the circumstances, may not be reasonable, particularly where social media content can be rapidly and broadly disseminated to investors and the markets.&rdquo;</p>
<p><em>Approval of Content</em>. Consider a requirement to have content pre-approved.</p>
<p><em>Firm Resources</em>. Consider whether the firm has sufficient resources to adequately monitor the use of social media and whether the use of outside vendors is necessary.</p>
<p><em>Criteria for Approving Participation</em>. Before approving the use of a social networking site, consider the reputation of the site, the site&rsquo;s privacy policy, the ability to remove third-party posts, controls on anonymous posting and the site&rsquo;s advertising practice.</p>
<p><em>Training and Certification</em>. Consider implementing training related to the use of social media to prevent potential violations of federal securities laws and internal policies. A firm may also consider a requirement for employees to certify that they understand and are complying with the social media policies and procedures.</p>
<p><em>Functionality</em>. Consider upgrades or modifications to the site that may affect any risk exposure for the firm or its clients. If the site includes a functionality that exposes the firm or its clients to violations of federal securities laws and/or privacy risks, and if that functionality cannot be disabled, consider whether use of such site is appropriate.</p>
<p><em>Personal/Professional Sites</em>. Consider adopting policies and procedures to address how investment adviser representatives or solicitors use personal or third-party social media sites to prevent firm business from being conducted on such site.</p>
<p><em>Information Security</em>. Consider whether allowing access to social media sites poses any information security risks. Firms should consider policies and procedures to create a firewall between sensitive customer information as well as the firm&rsquo;s proprietary information and any social media sites.</p>
<p><em>Enterprise Wide Sites</em>. Consider creating usage guidelines to prevent violations of the Advisers Act with respect to the advertising practices of a firm wide social media site if an investment adviser is part of a larger enterprise.</p>
<p>Advisers should expect that the SEC will be inquiring about the firm&rsquo;s use of social media, and the firm&rsquo;s policies and procedures on the same, in exams. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has also expressed interest in adopting regulations on the use of social media by investment advisers and issued a report on the same (see <em><a target="_blank" href="http://www.foleyhoag.com/NewsCenter/Publications/Alerts/Investment-Adviser/Foley-Adviser-071511b.aspx">Foley Adviser of July 15, 2011</a></em> on the <em>Massachusetts report</em>).</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/government-enforcement/sec-issues-guidance-on-use-of-social-media-by-investment-advisers/</link>
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<category>Government Enforcement</category><category>SEC</category><category>investment advisor</category><category>social media</category>
<pubDate>Fri, 13 Jan 2012 17:39:05 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

</item>
<item>
<title>Did You Know There Is a Congressional Cyber Security Caucus?</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Until yesterday, I did not know there was&nbsp;a <a href="http://congressionalcybersecuritycaucus.langevin.house.gov/about/">Congressional Cyber Security Caucus</a>.&nbsp; It is not clear what it has been up to, as it hasn't had a <a href="http://congressionalcybersecuritycaucus.langevin.house.gov/atom.xml">media release</a> in eleven months.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/government-enforcement/did-you-know-there-is-a-congressional-cyber-security-caucus/</link>
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<category>Caucus</category><category>Congress</category><category>Government Enforcement</category><category>cyber security</category>
<pubDate>Fri, 13 Jan 2012 11:45:47 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

</item>
<item>
<title>&quot;Performing Due Diligence Before Signing a Cloud SLA&quot;</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>My overview of some of the major issues involved in signing a cloud computing agreement can be found in <a href="http://&quot;Performing Due Diligence Before Signing a Cloud SLA&quot;">searchcloudcomputing, &quot;Performing Due Diligence Before Signing a Cloud SLA.&quot;</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; *&nbsp; *&nbsp; *<br />
<br />
No one is certain of all the legal risks associated with enterprises storing confidential or proprietary information outside the corporate firewall -- in the cloud. However, there is growing consensus about what companies should ask cloud vendors to maintain a secure IT environment and avoid potential legal risks associated with the cloud.&nbsp;</p>
<p>General areas of concern surrounding the cloud are similar to those of traditional IT:</p>
<ul>
    <li>Data security during transmission and storage;</li>
    <li>Data privacy and confidentiality;</li>
    <li>Rights of access in general as well as access for local governments and e-discovery;</li>
    <li>Data ownership;</li>
    <li>Suspension and termination of service;</li>
    <li>Forming and negotiating service-level agreements (SLAs) with cloud providers.<br />
    &nbsp;</li>
</ul>]]><![CDATA[<p>Because many leading cloud vendors are huge entities with an even larger customer base, fine details of an SLA aren&rsquo;t always negotiable. Often, SLAs are simply forms presented on a &ldquo;take-it-or-leave-it&rdquo; basis. As such, the first question you should consider is whether are you willing to put your company data into an environment where you are not in control of most of the terms of your engagement. If you&rsquo;re not comfortable with this, I recommend you look for a provider that is willing to discuss the terms of service.</p>
<p>Los Angeles city officials were able to negotiate their contract for Google applications in the cloud. But if you&rsquo;re not the second biggest city in the U.S., you may not be as lucky.</p>
<p>If you&rsquo;re new to cloud storage, consider prioritizing data storage. Many companies kick off a move into the cloud by migrating non-core data first. This allows them to trial the service and determine if it was cost effective without risking core business functions.</p>
<p>For example, a law firm that is new to cloud computing might decide to place back-office information in the cloud -- payroll, employee benefits -- before moving privileged and confidential client information outside the standard network firewall.</p>
<p><u><strong>Cloud SLAs and a la carte options <br />
</strong></u>Assuming you have a proposed SLA with a potential cloud vendor that is negotiable and you are ready to place some data in the cloud, there are some additional services you may want to look into before signing on the dotted line:</p>
<p>Request that sensitive data reside in a private cloud. This is a slight misnomer since the purpose of cloud computing is to achieve economies of scale by sharing facilities; however, there may be scenarios in which having a dedicated cloud infrastructure makes sense.</p>
<p>Seek special data encryption. If you have particularly sensitive information, you may want the cloud vendor to provide extra protections. For example, while there seems to be growing understanding that cloud providers are not business associates under HIPAA, this isn&rsquo;t universally known. You might want the cloud provider to agree to adhere to HIPAA standards, even if they&rsquo;re not required by law to do so.</p>
<p>Geographic restrictions on where your data is stored. For legal or client-relation purposes, you may not want data stored overseas where law enforcement is not as rigorous or the laws are uncertain.</p>
<p>Unique service levels. If your enterprise has special requirements for data access or use, don&rsquo;t be afraid to ask the cloud vendor for special service.</p>
<p>Special penalties for violation of agreement terms. If it is it important to you or your customers that there be especially high penalties for violating data privacy, ask for them.</p>
<p>Provisions that would deal with a change in ownership over your cloud provider. The cloud computing market is changing rapidly. You may want to build in a change-in-ownership or non-assignment clause into your SLA. In such a provision, you might also make clear that the cloud provider will never own the data that they hold for you, even if you decide to change providers.</p>
<p>Provision for business continuity in the event of a disaster.You need to know specifically what will happen to your data in the event of an earthquake, tsunami or other natural disaster.</p>
<p>In addition to these terms, you may want to add traditional IT outsourcing contract terms that you&rsquo;ve grown accustomed to regarding e-discovery functionality and indemnification from breaches, such as the ability to:</p>
<ul>
    <li>search based on defined criteria -- content, sender and/or recipient, date range and metadata;</li>
    <li>store search results with any metadata;</li>
    <li>add and delete from search results to create an e-discovery set.</li>
</ul>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2012/01/articles/cybersecurity-cybercrime/performing-due-diligence-before-signing-a-cloud-sla/</link>
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<category> service-level agreement</category><category>Cybersecurity &amp; Cybercrime</category><category>Data Breach</category><category>Google</category><category>Retail Industry &amp; Customer Information Spotlight</category><category>SLA</category><category>cloud computing</category><category>due diligence</category>
<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jan 2012 16:17:27 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<item>
<title>Is Public-Private Information Sharing Needed to Respond to the Massive Increase in Cyber Attacks?</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Interesting article in <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204844504577099072399702332.html">Friday's Wall Street Journal on potential cybersecurity legislation</a>&nbsp;to improve information sharing between industry and government.&nbsp; Perhaps the best part of the article is the citation of statistics from <a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/symantec 2009.pdf">Symantec's annual Internet Security Threat Report:&nbsp; Trends for&nbsp;2009</a>&nbsp;and <a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/Internet Security Threat Report.pdf">2010</a>&nbsp;on how many customer has updates Symantec sent out to address new attacks customers were facing:</p>
<ul>
    <li>2002:&nbsp; 20,254 updates</li>
    <li>2003:&nbsp; 19,159 updates</li>
    <li>2004:&nbsp; 74,981 updates</li>
    <li>2005:&nbsp; 113,081 updates</li>
    <li>2006:&nbsp; 167,069 updates</li>
    <li>2007:&nbsp; 708,742 updates</li>
    <li>2008:&nbsp; 1,691,323 updates</li>
    <li>2009:&nbsp; 2,895,802 updates</li>
    <li>2010:&nbsp; 10,000,000 updates</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/12/articles/cybersecurity-cybercrime/is-publicprivate-information-sharing-needed-to-respond-to-the-massive-increase-in-cyber-attacks/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/12/articles/cybersecurity-cybercrime/is-publicprivate-information-sharing-needed-to-respond-to-the-massive-increase-in-cyber-attacks/</guid>
<category>Cybersecurity &amp; Cybercrime</category><category>Legislation &amp; Regulation</category><category>Symantec</category><category>Wall Street Journal</category><category>cybersecurity</category><category>software</category><category>update</category>
<pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2011 15:39:26 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

</item>
<item>
<title>Is Public-Private Information Sharing Needed to Respond to the Massive Increase in Cyber Attacks?</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Interesting article in <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204844504577099072399702332.html">Friday's Wall Street Journal on potential cybersecurity legislation</a>&nbsp;to improve information sharing between industry and government.&nbsp; Perhaps the best part of the article is the citation of statistics from <a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/symantec 2009.pdf">Symantec's annual Internet Security Threat Report:&nbsp; Trends for&nbsp;2009</a>&nbsp;and <a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/Internet Security Threat Report.pdf">2010</a>&nbsp;on how many customer has updates Symantec sent out to address new attacks customers were facing:</p>
<ul>
    <li>2002:&nbsp; 20,254 updates</li>
    <li>2003:&nbsp; 19,159 updates</li>
    <li>2004:&nbsp; 74,981 updates</li>
    <li>2005:&nbsp; 113,081 updates</li>
    <li>2006:&nbsp; 167,069 updates</li>
    <li>2007:&nbsp; 708,742 updates</li>
    <li>2008:&nbsp; 1,691,323 updates</li>
    <li>2009:&nbsp; 2,895,802 updates</li>
    <li>2010:&nbsp; 10,000,000 updates</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/12/articles/cybersecurity-cybercrime/is-publicprivate-information-sharing-needed-to-respond-to-the-massive-increase-in-cyber-attacks/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/12/articles/cybersecurity-cybercrime/is-publicprivate-information-sharing-needed-to-respond-to-the-massive-increase-in-cyber-attacks/</guid>
<category>Cybersecurity &amp; Cybercrime</category><category>Legislation &amp; Regulation</category><category>Symantec</category><category>Wall Street Journal</category><category>cybersecurity</category><category>software</category><category>update</category>
<pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2011 15:39:26 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<item>
<title>&quot;Once More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends, Once More&quot;:  The Increasing Recognition of Complexity in Data Breach Response and Reporting</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/technology/as-patient-records-are-digitized-data-breaches-are-on-the-rise.html?_r=1&amp;hpw">article in today's New York Times</a>, we get some real-life insight into&nbsp;the difficulties in responding to a data breach.&nbsp; Even simple questions, like whether or not to report the breach and who is responsible for reporting it, take on unforeseen complexity.</p>
<p>The particular breach in question happened at the <a href="http://www.maehc.org">Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative</a>,&nbsp;when&nbsp;an employee's car was&nbsp;broken&nbsp;into and&nbsp;a company laptop stolen.&nbsp; The ramifications included:</p>
<ul>
    <li>spending nearly $300,000 in legal, private investigation, credit monitoring and media consultancy fees;</li>
    <li>devoting 600 person-hours of staff time to&nbsp;the breach;</li>
    <li>hiring&nbsp;a crisis team of lawyers and customers and a chief security officer;</li>
    <li>hiring a private investigator to scour local pawnshops and Craigslist for the stolen laptop; and</li>
    <li>notifying some of the affected patients and offering them free credit monitoring.</li>
</ul>
<p>The eHealth Collaborative's Executive Director, Micky Tripathi, first outlined the breach and&nbsp;critiques the article in <a href="http://maehc.blogspot.com/">his blog</a>.&nbsp; <br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/12/articles/data-breach-1/once-more-unto-the-breach-dear-friends-once-more-the-increasing-recognition-of-complexity-in-data-breach-response-and-reporting/</link>
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<category>Data Breach</category><category>Government Enforcement</category><category>Healthcare Industry Spotlight</category><category>Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative</category><category>Micky Tripathi</category><category>breach</category><category>disclosure</category>
<pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2011 15:13:25 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<title>Waiters at High-End Steakhouses Arrested for Stealing Customer Credit-Card Numbers</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>by <a href="http://www.foleyhoag.com/People/Attorneys/Bialas-Brian.aspx">Brian P. Bialas</a></p>
<p>At most restaurants, when the time comes to pay the check, you hand over your credit card and a waiter you&rsquo;ve known for only about an hour takes off with your credit card.&nbsp;You trust that the waiter will only charge your meal and won&rsquo;t make off with your card number.&nbsp; But if you ever have been to a <a href="http://www.legalseafoods.com/">Legal Sea Foods restaurant</a>, you will notice that the waiter brings a handheld electronic device to your table to swipe your credit card&nbsp;when you are ready to pay the bill.&nbsp;The credit card never leaves the customer&rsquo;s sight.</p>
<p><span>The <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/york-waiters-busted-stealing-credit-card-numbers-221022056.html">recent experiences of customers at certain high-end steakhouses&nbsp;</a>show why all restaurants should consider adopting the table-side charge method. &nbsp;Seven waiters at <a href="http://smithandwollensky.com/">Smith &amp; Wollensky&rsquo;s</a>, the <a href="http://www.thecapitalgrille.com/">Capital Grille</a>, and other high-end restaurants were arrested along with many other co-conspirators, for copying the credit card numbers of restaurant customers with handheld, high-tech &ldquo;skimmers&rdquo; and then using those numbers to buy luxury goods that they resold.&nbsp;The waiters targeted credit cards with high or no spending limits so that big purchases would not be flagged.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span>The <a href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI%20SSC%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf.">Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) quick reference guide for merchants</a> does not provide any clear guidelines for card handling.&nbsp; Nevertheless, this incident should serve as a wakeup call for all restaurants to adopt table-side systems to reduce the potention for misuse of customer credit cards.&nbsp; It also serves as a reminder to anyone dealing with sensitive information to continually review handling procedures and processes and look for ways transmissions can be made more secure.</span></p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/12/articles/data-breach-1/waiters-at-highend-steakhouses-arrested-for-stealing-customer-creditcard-numbers/</link>
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<category>Data Breach</category><category>PCI-DSS</category><category>Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard</category><category>Retail Industry &amp; Customer Information Spotlight</category><category>Security Programs &amp; Policies</category><category>credit card</category><category>quick reference guide for merchants</category><category>restaurants</category><category>skimmers</category><category>waiter</category>
<pubDate>Thu, 01 Dec 2011 15:45:05 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<item>
<title>Facebook Settles FTC Charges that It Deceived Consumers, Agrees to 20 Year Consent Order</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In a settlement announced today by the <a href="http://www.ftc.gov">Federal Trade Commission </a>and <a href="http://www.facebook.com">Facebook</a>, the social networking service&nbsp;agreed to settle&nbsp;&quot;charges that it deceived consumers by telling them they could keep their information on Facebook private, and then repeatedly allowing it to be shared and made public,&quot; according to the <a href="http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm">FTC's press release</a>.<br />
<br />
In its <a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/ftcfacebookcomplaint2011[1].pdf">complaint</a>, the FTC alleged, among other things, that Facebook &ldquo;users could not restrict access to their profile information to specific groups, such as &ldquo;Only Friends&rdquo; or &ldquo;Friends of Friends&rdquo; through their Profile Privacy Settings,&rdquo; despite Facebook's representations that users could impose such restrictions on their accounts.</p>
<p>In the extensive&nbsp;<a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/facebookagreement and consent order 2011.pdf">consent order Facebook entered with the FTC</a>, Facebook agreed (among other things)&nbsp;to &ldquo;obtain initial and biennial assessments and reports . . . from a qualified, objective, independent third-party professional, who uses procedures and standards generally accepted in the profession,&rdquo; which assessments and reports will:</p>
<ul>
    <li>set forth the specific privacy controls that [Facebook] has implemented and maintained during the reporting period;<br />
    &nbsp;</li>
    <li>explain how such privacy controls are appropriate to [Facebook's] size and complexity, the nature and scope of [Facebook's] activities, and the sensitivity of the covered information;<br />
    &nbsp;</li>
    <li>explain how the privacy controls that have been implemented meet or exceed the protections required by Part IV of this order; and<br />
    &nbsp;</li>
    <li>certify that the privacy controls are operating with sufficient effectiveness to provide reasonable assurance to protect the privacy of covered information and that the controls have so operated throughout the reporting period.</li>
</ul>
<p>This consent order will last for an astoundingly&nbsp;long time: &nbsp;<u><em>20 years</em></u>.&nbsp; (Query whether this agreement's terms and length will become the standard&nbsp;for future FTC privacy settlements.)&nbsp;</p>
<p>Facebook founder <a href="https://www.facebook.com/zuck?ref=blog">Mark Zuckerberg </a>also released a <a href="https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=10150378701937131">blog post </a>on the settlement, and in it he announced a split in the company's privacy officer role:&nbsp;&nbsp;Erin Egan will become Facebook's Chief Privacy Officer, Policy, and Michael Richter, currently Facebook's Chief Privacy Counsel,&nbsp;will become Facebook's Chief Privacy Officer, Products.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/11/articles/government-enforcement/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-that-it-deceived-consumers-agrees-to-20-year-consent-order/</link>
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<category>FTC</category><category>Facebook</category><category>Government Enforcement</category><category>Legislation &amp; Regulation</category><category>Mark Zuckerberg</category><category>Retail Industry &amp; Customer Information Spotlight</category><category>Security Programs &amp; Policies</category><category>consent order</category><category>privacy</category><category>privacy officer</category><category>settlement</category>
<pubDate>Tue, 29 Nov 2011 15:58:17 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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<item>
<title>Sen. McCain Inserts Cybersecurity Amendment into DoD Authorization Act</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>My colleague <a href="http://www.foleyhoag.com/People/Specialists/Cristinzio-Dayle.aspx?pdf=1">Dayle Cristinzio, former&nbsp;Legislative Director for&nbsp;Senator Harry&nbsp;Reid,&nbsp;</a>has provided me with the amendments to&nbsp;<a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/1867  FY12 NDAA[1].pdf">Senate Bill1867, the Department of Defense Authorization Act</a>.&nbsp; Among these amendments&nbsp;is one from Sen. McCain,&nbsp;<a href="http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/uploads/file/McCain1229.pdf">amendment #1229</a>, which could&nbsp;provide greater cybersecurity collaboration between&nbsp;the <a href="http://www.defense.gov/">Department of Defense </a>and the <a href="http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm">Department&nbsp;of Homeland Security</a>.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/11/articles/recent-legislation-1/sen-mccain-inserts-cybersecurity-amendment-into-dod-authorization-act/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2011/11/articles/recent-legislation-1/sen-mccain-inserts-cybersecurity-amendment-into-dod-authorization-act/</guid>
<category>Dayle Cristinzio</category><category>Department of Defense</category><category>Department of Defense Authorization Act</category><category>Department of Homeland Security</category><category>Legislation &amp; Regulation</category><category>Sen. McCain</category><category>Senate Bill1867</category><category>Senator Harry Reid</category><category>amendment #1229</category><category>collaboration</category><category>cybersecurity</category>
<pubDate>Sun, 20 Nov 2011 12:28:16 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Colin J. Zick</dc:creator>

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